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Abstract
Rational politicians are interested in judicial independence (JI) in order to make their
promises credible. But if politicians’ preferences deviate from the dicta of the judiciary, they
also have incentives to renege on judicial independence. These two conflicting aspects are
measured by two indicators: (i) de iure JI focusing on its legal foundations and (ii) a de facto
JI focusing on countries’ actually experience. Whether JI affects economic growth is tested
for a cross section of 57 countries. While de iure JI does not have an impact on real GDP
growth per capita growth, de facto JI positively influences it.
JEL Code: H11, K40, O40, P51.














Thriving market economies depend on strong states that secure private property rights and
their voluntary transfer. Yet, the strength of the state can be its greatest weakness: if it is
strong enough to secure private property rights, it could also be strong enough to attenuate
them or even to expropriate its citizens (Weingast, 1993). A simple promise to honor private
property rights in the future will not be credible: the citizens know that, after they have in-
vested, the state has an incentive not to keep its promises and to hold citizens up. In such a
setting, an independent judiciary could make all actors better off: if it is able to make the rep-
resentatives of the state stick to their promises, additional (physical and human capital) in-
vestment could lead to higher income and growth, but also to higher tax receipts of the state.
It would thus seem that rational politicians should have introduced judicial independence for
long. But simply promising an independent judiciary might not be sufficient to induce addi-
tional investment: as long as potential investors do not believe that the judiciary will really be
impartial, they might not change their investment behavior. It thus seems to make sense to
distinguish two kinds of judicial independence (JI), namely de iure and de facto JI. Whereas
de iure JI can be derived from looking at the letter of the law, de facto JI is the independence
factually enjoyed by judges and justices which will be the result of their effective term
lengths, of the degree to which their judgments have an impact on government behavior etc.
In this paper, it is analyzed whether judicial independence is also conducive to economic
growth. Two indicators of judicial independence are introduced: (i) a de iure indicator focus-
ing on the legal foundations of judicial independence and (ii) a de facto indicator focusing on
the factually ascertainable degree of judicial independence. For a sample of 66 countries an
econometric model is estimated according to which real GDP growth per capita between 1980
and 1998 is explained by judicial independence and standard controls. While de iure judicial
independence does not have any impact on economic growth, de facto judicial independence
positively influences GDP growth. The model is extended by checking the robustness of the
results to proxies for economic freedom, legal origin of a country and political stability.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 elaborates possible conse-
quences of JI on economic growth in a little more detail. In Section 3, the indicator is set into
context with related literature.  Section 4  presents the two indicators. In  Section 5 , the
econometric model is introduced, Section 6 contains the discussion of the econometric analy-
sis, and Section 7 concludes.– 2 –
2 The Crucial Importance of Judicial Independence for Economic Growth and De-
velopment
JI implies that judges can expect their decisions to be implemented regardless of whether they
are in the (short-term) interest of other government branches upon whom implementation de-
pends. It would further imply that judges – apart from their decisions not being implemented
– do not have to anticipate negative consequences as the result of their decisions, such as (a)
being expelled, (b) being paid less, or (c) being made less influential.
Three archetypical interaction situations in which JI is important can be distinguished:
(1)  In cases of conflict between citizens: If contracting parties voluntarily entered into a
contract and one of the parties believes that the other side hasn’t lived up to the contract,
impartial dispute resolution is important. As long as both sides expect the judiciary to be
impartial, they can save on transaction costs while negotiating the contract. On average,
lower transaction costs will lead to more welfare-enhancing transactions taking place.
(2)  In cases of conflict between government and the citizens, the citizens are in need of an
organization that can adjudicate who is right, i.e. who has acted according to the law.
The judiciary will not only have to ascertain the constitutionality of newly passed legis-
lation but also to check whether the representatives of the state have followed the proce-
dural devices that are to safeguard the rule of law. If the judiciary is not independent
from executive and legislature, citizens will not trust in the relevance of the rule of law.
(3)  In cases of conflict between various government branches: In the absence of an impar-
tial arbiter, conflicts between government branches are most likely to develop into
power games. An independent judiciary can keep them within the rules laid out in the
constitution.
Among the many functions of government, the reduction of uncertainty is of paramount im-
portance. But the law will only reduce uncertainty if the citizens can expect the letter of the
law to be followed by government representatives. An independent judiciary could thus also
be interpreted as a device to turn promises – e.g. to respect property rights and abstain from
expropriation – into credible commitments. If it functions like this, citizens will develop a
longer time horizon which will lead to more investment in physical capital but also to a higher
degree of specialization, i.e., to a different structure of human capital. All this means that JI is
expected to be conducive to economic growth.– 3 –
3 Putting Judicial Independence Into Context
We are not aware of any indicators measuring both de iure and de facto JI. Nevertheless, there
is, of course, a literature dealing with JI and its effects. Judicial independence has been mod-
elled as the amount of discretion that judges have at their disposal vis-à-vis representatives of
other government branches. This has typically been done using spatial voting models (Moser,
2000 is an overview with applications to a number of independent agencies).1 With regard to
any decision, the ideal points of all relevant actors are somehow distributed in space. The
amount of discretion that the judiciary has at its disposal depends on the exact location of the
ideal points of the other actors. If it anticipates their location correctly, it can make a decision
that maximizes its own utility subject to the relevant constraints that is (i) the danger of being
overridden by fresh legislation that would be passed through the legislature or (ii) by having
its dicta ignored by the executive. These models particularly focus on the power game played
between representatives of the various government branches. Applying them empirically is,
however, often close to impossible as the relevant dimensions of many issues are not evident
and the ideal points of many actors are difficult to identify. We therefore chose another ap-
proach to derive cross country comparisons regarding de iure and de facto JI.
The literature analyzing the effects of central bank independence (CBI) on inflation is more
closely related to the approach towards JI presented here. Various approaches towards meas-
uring CBI have been proposed (Cukierman, 1992, Cukierman/Webb/Neyapti, 1992, Debelle/
Fisher, 1995, Grilli/Masciandaro/Tabellini, 1991 are examples). It turns out that de iure CBI
is a good predictor for monetary stability only in OECD countries but that the turnover rate of
central bank governors (a de facto proxy) is a much better predictor for less developed coun-
tries (Berger et al., 2001 and Hayo/Hefeker, 2002 are two recent surveys). Keefer and Stasav-
age (2001) have added to this literature by pointing out that a higher number of political veto
players increases the chances that formal CBI will be correlated with low inflation levels.
It can be argued that there are a number of structural similarities between the role and effects
of central banks and the judiciary. The most important similarity is probably that both the
judiciary and a central bank can help government to mitigate a credibility problem. That gov-
                                                
1.  There are models on judicial discretion in statutory interpretation (e.g. Ferejohn and Weingast, 1992) and
on the reactions of the legislature (e.g. Gely and Spiller, 1990). Others have analyzed the relationship be-
tween Congress and bureaucracy extensively (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984, McCubbins, Noll, Wein-
gast, 1987, 1989; Moe, 1990; Macey, 1992; Zeppos, 1993). There is plenty of institutional detail in these
models. This, however, is also one of their weaknesses as they are almost exclusively focused on the U.S.– 4 –
ernment runs into a time inconsistency problem if it does not delegate monetary policy is wi-
dely acknowledged (Kydland/Prescott, 1977, Barro/Gordon, 1983). As shown in the last sec-
tion, government also runs into a credibility problem concerning the safety of property rights
if there is no neutral and independent arbiter who has the power to adjudicate whether gov-
ernment action has remained within the letter of the law (i.e., the ‘promises’ of the govern-
ment). Some of the variables used here were inspired by the indicators used to measure CBI.
4 Introducing Two New Indicators
4.1  Introductory Remarks
In this paper, we introduce two indicators that are as objective as possible. They are based on
verifiable facts and not on subjective evaluations.
2
 Anybody interested in recalculating them
should, in principle, arrive at identival values. The components making up our indicator of
judicial independence reflect the major aspects one has conventionally in mind when talking
about these concepts. We are interested in a measure of the independence of an entire gov-
ernment branch. In many states, this branch is made up of thousands of decision-makers. Of-
ten, there is an elaborate division of labor between specialized courts. In federal states, there
usually is a state judiciary, which is separate from the federal one. In short, complexity needs
to be radically reduced. We therefore propose to focus on just one court for every country,
namely its highest court. Regardless of whether it deals exclusively with constitutional issues
(as, e.g., the German Constitutional Court) or whether it is the Supreme Court for all areas of
law (as, e.g., the U.S. Supreme Court), it will deal with interpreting the Constitution. If the
Constitution is viewed as the most basic rule set of a state, its interpretation will be of great
importance. The court system is organized hierarchically, with the higher courts being able to
overrule the sentences of the lower courts. It is therefore the independence of the highest court
that is important for the degree of judicial independence observed in a polity.3
                                                
2.  The full text of the questionnaire on which the two indicators are based is reprinted in the appendix. The
appendix also includes the detailed coding of the two indicators of judicial independence. Note, however,
that the coding was only added here and was not part of the questionnaire as sent to the experts.
3. It can, of course, be argued that private law courts are more relevant for the security of property rights and
investment behavior than constitutional courts. For a follow-up study, it would thus be interesting to meas-
ure the independence of private law courts and compare it with the indicators presented here.– 5 –
4.2 A de iure Indicator for Measuring Judicial Independence
This measure is solely based on the legal foundations as found in legal documents. We draw
on 23 characteristics grouped into twelve variables in order to assess JI. Each of the twelve
variables can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater values indicate a higher degree of
JI. A country with a maximum degree of JI could thus get a sum of 12. Unfortunately, for
some of the countries included in this sample, we were not able to get data for all 12 vari-
ables. We therefore decided to divide the sum of the coded variables by the number of vari-
ables for which data was available. The indicator can thus take on any value between 0 and 1.4
Here is a list of the 12 variables and the reasoning used for coding them:
(1 and 2)The independence of judges is dependent upon the stability of the set of institutional
arrangements within which they operate. Formally, the stability of the powers and pro-
cedures of the court depend on how difficult it is to change them. If they are specified in
the constitution itself, we expect a greater degree of independence than in cases where
these arrangements are fixed by ordinary law. This does only hold, however, if a major-
ity is needed to change the constitution, which is more inclusive than that which is
needed to pass ordinary legislation. We therefore asked (1) whether the highest court is
anchored in the constitution and (2) how difficult it is to amend the constitution.
(3) The appointment procedure of the judges may have a notable effect on the independence
of the court. As it is inter alia supposed to protect citizens from illegitimate use of pow-
ers by the authorities as well as to settle disputes between the branches of government, it
ought to be as independent as possible from the other branches. We hypothesize that the
most independent procedure for judicial appointment is by professionals (other judges or
jurists). The least independent method is appointment by one powerful politician (the
prime minister or the minister of justice, e.g.).
                                                
4.  This means that equal weight is attached to all variables. It can, of course, be argued that they should be
weighted according to their importance. This presupposes, however, that there is a theory according to
which weights could be distributed. Such a theory is not available at present. One could also think of at-
taching weights ex post, for example by using factor analysis, such that the explanatory fit is maximized.
Indeed any weighting is more or less arbitrary without the existence of a proper theory for construction of
the indexes. This also holds with respect to factors extracted from the set of single variables. In the latter
case, only statistical criteria are relevant in the construction of the index and it is up to the analyst to inter-
pret the factors obtained. We leave a further discussion of different weights to future analysis and concen-
trate on the simplest method of computing the indexes by taking an (unweighted) average of the variables.– 6 –
(4/6) Judicial tenure will be crucial for the independence of the judiciary. We assume that
judges are most independent if they are appointed for life (or up to a mandatory retire-
ment age) and cannot be removed from office, save by legal procedure.
(5) Judges are less independent if terms are renewable because they have an incentive to
please those who can reappoint them.
(7) Further, if the members of one of the other government branches enjoy discretion in
determining the salaries of the judges, this raises incentives to take the preferences of
these members explicitly into account. In contrast, general rules that their salaries cannot
be reduced increase, in turn, the independence of the judiciary.
(8) Additionally, judges need to be paid adequately in comparison with other jobs that
qualified lawyers can exercise such as practicing as a private lawyer or teaching as a
university professor.
(9) Another component of judicial independence is the accessibility of the court and its
ability to initiate proceedings. A court which is accessible only by a certain number of
members of parliament or other officials will be less effective in constraining govern-
ment vis-à-vis its citizens than a court, which is accessible by every citizen who claims
that her rights are violated.5
(10) If the allocation of cases to the various members of the court is at the discretion of the
chief justice, his influence will be substantially greater than that of the other members of
the court. It follows that in such an institutional environment, it could be worth trying to
‘buy’ just the chief justice. We expect independence to be larger if there is a general rule
according to which cases are allocated the responsibility of single members of the court.
(11) The competencies assigned to the constitutional court do not bear directly on its inde-
pendence. Yet, highest courts must have certain competencies in order to be able to
check the behavior of the other government branches. If the constitution is interpreted as
the most basic formal layer of rules that is to restrain (and to enable) government, then
constitutional review, i.e. the competence of the court to check whether legislation is in
conformity with the constitution is crucial.
                                                
5.  One referee pointed out that this might easily lead to congestion problems which might, in turn, paralyze the
court and undermine its position. Resources for judicial decision-making are indeed scarce but that does not
seem a good reason not to grant effective legal protection to individual citizens. Facing scarce resources,
courts will devise their own procedures of access. The examples of the U.S. and Germany seem to indicate
that this does not need to undermine the position of the court.– 7 –
(12) If courts have to publish their decisions, they can be scrutinized by others and the rea-
soning can become subject to public debate. This can be interpreted as making it more
difficult for representatives of the other government branches to have irrelevant consid-
erations influence their decisions. The transparency will be even higher if the courts
publish dissenting opinions.
4.3 A de facto Measure for Judicial Independence
We now turn to possible ways of measuring JI not as it is written down in legal documents but
as it is factually implemented. As with regard to the de iure indicator, no one single proxy
adequately reflects all relevant aspects of JI. To assess de facto JI, eight variables have been
used. Again, each of the eight variables can take on values between 0 and 1 where greater
values indicate a higher degree of JI.
The de iure indicator is based on various legal documents. Even if they are changed fre-
quently, exact values can be calculated for every single point in time, depending on the formal
validity of the respective documents. This does not hold for de facto JI. The factual term
length of Highest Court judges cannot be calculated right after a new constitution has been
passed but will be the result of years of living with the legal documents. We therefore base the
de facto indicator on quite a long period, namely that between 1960 and today. This means, of
course, that the indicator will be very sticky in comparison to the de iure indicator. Some re-
spondents simply did not answer to the second part of the questionnaire because they believed
it did not apply to their countries. The countries of Central and Eastern European are a case in
point here: all of them passed new constitutions after 1990. According to the time span pro-
posed by our indicator, the treatment of the judiciary by socialist regimes still weighs heavily
on today’s de facto values. We chose this approach because we think the past matters for how
JI is evaluated by citizens and other potential investors. A government – or more broadly: a
regime – will not be able to build up a reputation as law-abiding or JI-respecting overnight.
Here is a list of the eight variables and the reasoning used for coding them:
(1 – 3) A crucial aspect of the de facto JI will be the effective average term length of the
members of the highest court.6 For coding, we simply multiplied the effective average
term length in years with 0.05. In other words: a country gets the highest possible rating– 8 –
if the average term length is twenty years (or more). If the actual term length and the one
to be expected on the basis of the legal foundations deviate, the country is coded 0 in the
following variable. Removing a judge before the end of term is a serious breach of JI.
Whenever that has occurred at least once, the country is coded 0 for that variable.
(4) The influence of a judge depends on the number of other judges who are members of the
same court. By increasing the number of judges, the weight of those judges who do not
decide along the lines of the preferences of the median members of the other branches
can supposedly be diminished. This is exactly what President Roosevelt had in mind
with his plan to ‘pack’ the Supreme Court. It was thus asked how many times the num-
ber of judges had been changed since 1960.
(5 – 6) The importance of an adequate income was already discussed with regard to the de
iure indicator. With regard to the de facto situation, we were interested to learn whether
the incomes of judges have at least remained constant in real terms. But the efficacy of
courts does not only depend on the income level of judges but also on the number of
clerks employed, the size of the library, the availability of modern computer equipment
etc. We have tried to take this aspect into account by asking for the development of the
court’s budget as an organization.
(7) Any change in the basis of the legal foundation of the highest court will increase uncer-
tainty among its potential users, i.e. will be counter to one of the most fundamental
functions of the law. Frequent changes of the respective legal rules are here interpreted
as an indicator for low de facto independence.
(8) The de facto degree of judicial independence is low if decisions of the highest court, in
order to be implemented, depend on some action of one (or both) of the other branches
of government and this cooperation is not granted. The more frequently this has been the
case, the less independent is JI supposed to be factually.
The de iure indicator has been calculated for 75 countries. Getting data for the de facto indi-
cator is more difficult than for the de iure indicator. In order to ensure a minimum amount of
accuracy, countries were only ranked if a minimum of three variables for de facto independ-
ence were available. This explains the lower number of countries ranked here (namely 66).
                                                                                                                                     
6.  This variable is closely reminiscent of the turnover rate calculated for central bank governors and used as a
proxy for their de facto independence. Henisz (2000) has calculated this variable for the tenure of supreme
court judges for 45 countries for the period from 1960 to 1990.– 9 –
Information was enquired by country experts via a questionnaire that was e-mailed to them
jointly with a short paper explaining purpose and hypotheses of the enterprise. For filling in
the questionnaire, the country experts did not have to make personal evaluations of the situa-
tion in the country, but were asked to simply give information on the legal structure of the
judiciary. Among the country experts were Supreme Court judges, law professors, lawyers
but also activists from organizations such as Transparency International. Mails were sent to
far more than 75 experts but many recipients never answered or promised to fill in the ques-
tionnaire later. The choice of countries could be called ‘biased random’ due to a number of
factors: contacts to legal experts are not equally spread around the world, use of e-mail is also
not equally distributed around the world. But cultural factors might also play in. The Middle
and Far East as well as Africa are clearly underrepresented in our study.
4.4 A Comparison of Indicators
The ranking of countries according to the de iure index (Appendix 2) at first sight contains
more than one surprise: among the nine top-scoring countries, there is not one single OECD-
member. Long established democracies with affluent economies such as the U.S. or Switzer-
land fare rather badly: the U.S. is ranked 30th, Switzerland with its 67th rank even belongs to
the lowest-ranked quintile. However, this ranking solely reflects JI as it is written down in
various legal documents. Politicians all over the world have incentives to promise to their
citizens that the judiciary will be independent. Most of the top-ranked countries have, e.g.,
close ties with the U.S. and U.S.-American legal thinking, which emphasizes the importance
of judicial independence.
7 Large parts of Georgia’s Constitution were drafted by law profes-
sors from Chicago Law School. It is not astonishing that they put heavy emphasis on the for-
mal independence of the judiciary. What will be more interesting therefore is to inquire
whether the de facto indicator reflects a similar ranking or whether the two indicators diverge.
There is indeed a notable divergence between both indicators of judicial independence. Not a
single country in the ‘Top Ten’ of the de iure JI index is in the ‘Top Ten’ of the de facto JI
index. Moreover, like in the case of the de iure index, the ranking of the de facto index is
rather unexpected: The good results of Armenia and Kuwait in the ranking (Appendix 3) can
probably be made plausible by the low number of variables used (namely 3), but this does not
                                                
7.  These countries outrank the U.S. because some of the competencies that the U.S. Supreme Court factually
holds – such as constitutional review – only emerged over time but are not fixed in the constitution. Most of
the more recent constitutions incorporate this competence on the constitutional level.– 10 –
explain the good ranking of, say, Turkey (six variables) or Taiwan (eight). On the other hand,
the good ranking of Switzerland as well as the fact that there is no EU member state among
the lowest quintile conforms more strongly to common prejudices. Among the lowest quintile
are only one OECD-member (the Czech Republic which has been a member since 1995), but
some of the East European and African states that one would intuitively expect to fare badly.
It cannot be completely excluded that some questionnaire respondents pursue their own
agenda and have an incentive to make reality fit to it: a loyal citizen could try to make his
country look better than it really is whereas a political activist striving for improvement might
try to make her country look worse than it really is. Respondents may have a tendency to give
the ‘socially desired’ answers. It should also be noted that in principle, a judiciary that scru-
pulously follows the wishes of – say – the executive could score very well in the de facto
score: a dictator could nominate one’s family and friends as judges; as long as they con-
formed to his wishes, he would not have any incentives to kick them out of office, to reduce
their salary or the budget of the court etc. This can indeed not be entirely excluded. The ques-
tion would be as to what aspects we could check for in order to insure that this is not the case.
The number of laws struck down by the highest court as unconstitutional (may be as a pro-
portion of all laws passed) is not a good proxy for a number of reasons: (i) often, the highest
court does not have the competency to initiate constitutional review; it thus depends on others
initiating this process; (ii) the legislature will not naïvely maximize the utility of its median
member but will try to anticipate the position of the court and will subsequently adjust its own
position in order not to be called back by the court.
8 In that sense, a law that is struck down by
the court represents an expression of faulty expectations concerning jurisdiction by the ma-
jority of the legislature.
We now turn to discussing the correlation with various indicators that serve similar purposes
(Table 1). The rule of law-data are provided by the publishers of the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG), an organization which sells information to private firms interested in
business relations.
9 We use the data as they are provided by the authors of the Economic
                                                
8.  Voigt (1999) explores the relevant strategic interactions between the members of the three government
branches in more detail.
9.  Unfortunately, they have already been corrected. Ratings for some countries rated here were not provided
for by ICRG: Estonia and Lithuania were rated on the basis of Poland and Russia, Slovenia on that of the
Czech Republic and Slovakia. Another country for which we provide original data was scored according to
the ratings of apparently similar countries, namely Mauritius on that of Botswana.– 11 –
Freedom Index (Gwartney, Lawson, and Samida, 2000). There, the fifth out of seven groups
of variables is entitled ‘Legal Structure and Property Rights’. The specific variable is de-
scribed as ‘Rule of Law: Legal Institutions, Including Access to a Nondiscriminatory Judici-
ary That Are Supportive of the Principles of Rule of Law’. It is still astonishing that the cor-
relation with our de iure indicator does not even have a positive sign; this is the case with the
correlation between our de facto indicator and the rule of law-data but the correlation is far
from perfect even then. Something similar happens with the data provided by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU) that are supposed to proxy for the transparency and accountability of
the legal systems of 60 countries. Again, the correlation with the de iure index does not have
a positive sign, while the one with our de facto indicator does.
Table 1: Correlation Matrix of the Indicators of Judicial Independence with Other
Indicators











De facto 0.179 1
Rule of Law -0.116 0.317 1
Transparency -0.063 0.573 0.594 1
Civil liberty -0.109 -0.335 -0.489 -0.773 1
Property Rights -0.204 -0.409 -0.615 -0.828 0.705 1
‘Smithey’ -0.258 0.277 -0.222 -0.170 0.068 0.334 1
Notes: ‘Rule of law’ as provided by the Economic Freedom Index (Gwartney, Lawson, and Samida, 2000);
The index on transparency and accountability of the legal systems is taken from the Economist Intelligence
Unit; Freedom House (2001) represents the civil liberties on a scale between 1 and 7 where 1 represents the
best possible value. Note that a negative sign with the other indicators stands for a positive correlation. The
Heritage Foundation in conjunction with the Wall Street Journal offer another index of economic freedom
(Heritage Foundation and Wall Street Journal, 2002). The variable used here is the one on property rights.
The rights are on a scale between 1 and 5 where 1 stands for the highest possible value (correlations should
thus have a negative sign safe for the one with the Freedom House data) and ‘Smithey’ is the shorthand for
the various degrees of ‘judicial power and independence’ chosen in the transition countries of Central and
Eastern Europe as reported and calculated by Smithey and Ishiyama (2000).
 ‘Smithey’ is the shorthand for a paper by Smithey and Ishiyama (2000) who try to explain
the various degrees of ‘judicial power and independence’ chosen in the transition countries of
Central and Eastern Europe. They construct a ‘judicial power score’ that has some similarities
with the one constructed here. It is very surprising that it is negatively correlated with our de
iure score whereas it is positively correlated with our de facto score. Part of the problem
might be the small sample overlap: data from both sets exist for only 14 countries.
Many correlation coefficients are very low which is irritating at first sight. It can be argued
however that the various indicators measure different things. If the correlation between these– 12 –
indicators is relatively low, it simply means that the relationships are not as straightforward as
sometimes assumed.10 But let us now turn to an econometric analysis of the impact of judicial
independence on economic growth.
5 Estimation Approach and Data Description
The workhorse for the empirical analysis is an equation that de Haan and Sturm (2000) call ‘a
variant of the Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA)’ (p. 228) with the difference that we do not
report the extreme bounds but different estimation results providing for the extreme bounds.
According to this approach the following equation is estimated:
i i i i i Z JI M Y e g b a + + + = D ,                                (1)
where  i Y D  is average real GDP growth per capita of country i between the years 1980 and
1998,  i M  is a vector of standard explanatory variables of country i,  i JI  are the de iure and de
facto indicators of judicial independence in country i,  i Z  is a vector of additional explanatory
variables in country i that are introduced to check the robustness of the baseline model, and
i e is an error term.
Average real GDP growth per capita is obtained from the new Penn World Tables Version 6.0
(Heston, Summers and Aten, 2001) which has been authorized for use in the end of December
2001 and revised in summer 2002. The data set poses particular problems with respect to
Eastern European countries. Since the data of these countries in the nineties are not compara-
ble to data in the eighties or do even not exist for the eighties because these are newly created
states, real GDP growth per capita had to be averaged for these countries depending on the
first date GDP data are available instead of averaging it for the time period 1980 to 1998.
11
The use of the PWT 6.0 data set reduces the sample from 75 countries covered by the de iure
                                                
10.  It could be argued that JI is a crucial precondition for safe property rights. Yet, it is surely not a sufficient
condition. Enquiring more closely into these relationships could be a topic for an additional paper.
11.  Real GDP growth per capita is averaged in the following way: Slovak Republic 1987 to 1998, Czech R e-
public and Slovenia 1990 to 1998, Bulgaria and Russia 1991 to 1998, Armenia and Estonia 1992 to 1998,
Lithuania 1993 to 1998, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan 1994 to 1998, Croatia 1995 to 1998 and Georgia 1996
to 1998. Real GDP growth per capita thus reflects less and less the long run growth rate that is supposed to
be measured according to the underlying growth theory. This is particularly problematic in the case of
Georgia. The structural shift between West German and Unified German growth data is coped with in the
following way: First, the average growth rate of GDP is computed for the period 1980 to 1990 for West
Germany. Second, we compute the average growth rate of GDP for the period 1990 to 1998 for Unified
Germany. Third, we take the mean of both rates.– 13 –
index and 66 countries covered by the de facto index to 66 and 57 countries respectively.
Compared to Appendix 2 and 3, the countries Bahamas, Coratia, Kuwait, Montenegro and
Vanuato had to be excluded from the sample.
The vector  i M  consists of three variables, which are robustly linked to economic growth ac-
cording to previous studies (see de Haan and Sturm, 2000). These variables are the level of
initial real GDP per capita (in our sample, ‘initial’ is 1980), private and public investment in
percent of GDP averaged over the period 1980 to 1998, and the percentage of secondary
school attained in the total population aged 15 and more in 1980. With the exception of the
latter variable, which is from the Barro and Lee data set, these data are from the PWT 6.0.
The additional economic variables making up for the vector  i Z  are average government con-
sumption in percent of GDP between 1980 and 1996, openness measured by the sum of ex-
ports and imports in percent of GDP, average population growth between 1980 and 1998, and
the average inflation rate, all from the PWT 6.0 data set. The reason for an inclusion of these
variables for testing robustness of the impact of judicial independence stems from a whole
bunch of empirical growth studies. Again, de Haan and Sturm (2000) provide an excellent
selective survey on these arguments. In addition to these standard additional variables,  the
data by La Porta et al. (1999) on the legal origin of countries are used to test robustness of the
growth impact of JI to the legal and political environment. Moreover, the economic freedom
indices as well as the political stability data by the World Bank (2001) and data on the age of
a country’s constitution are included for robustness checks in order to find out whether the
impact of JI still holds if variables are included that may partly incorporate JI as a component
or that appear to bear some relation to JI.
The empirical strategy is following along the lines underlying this model. First, the baseline
regressions are performed adding the two JI indicators in turn. In a second step, the robustness
of these results to outliers is checked because the shorter time period in which data are avail-
able for Eastern European and CIS countries may lead to specific problems. In a third step,
the JI indices are differentiated into their single components. Fourth, the additional variables
are included in the regression. We present only a selection of robustness checks in order to
make the paper still readable. Several further variations of these regressions are not reported
here which were also performed in order to check robustness. Finally, the robustness of the
results to the construction of the de facto JI variable is tested. As mentioned above, those
countries were included in the regression analysis that reported at least three components of– 14 –
the de facto index. Of course, it is an arbitrary decision how many questions one wants to
have replied to. Since particularly the ranking of those countries with only three components
appears to be surprising, e.g. Armenia, Kuwait, but also the Netherlands, regressions are re-
ported for countries that answered four of the questions underlying the de facto JI index. The
cross section analysis is performed by the simple OLS technique while inference is based on
t-statistics computed on the basis of White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.12
6 Estimation Results
The estimation results of the baseline specification are presented in Table 2. It is obvious that
the three basic economic variables explain average real economic growth per capita only
modestly (Column (1)). The explanatory variables have the expected signs and some e x-
planatory power however. Initial real GDP per capita has a negative impact on economic
growth that is significant on the 5 percent significance level. Thus, a catch up-effect can be
observed in the cross-country sample used here as well. The real investment share has the
expected positive impact on economic growth and is significant on the 10 percent level.
While the secondary school attainment rate has the expected positive impact it does not reach
any conventional significance level. Given the inclusion of Eastern European and CIS coun-
tries to a cross-country sample and the potential problems in the reliability of their data from
the eighties, the results for schooling should not be too disturbing.
The explanatory power is not improved if the de iure JI indicator is introduced in the model
(Column (2)). The adjusted R
2 increases from 12 to 15 percent only. Adding the de iure JI
indicator to the baseline regression does not alter the estimation results. De iure JI has the
expected positive impact on average real GDP growth per capita but it is not significantly
different from zero. Introducing  de facto JI instead of de iure JI ( Column (3)) noticeably
changes the estimation results however. It nearly doubles the explanatory power of the em-
pirical model measured in the adjusted R
2. Moreover, and as expected, de facto JI has a posi-
tive impact on real economic growth per capita and is significantly different from zero on the
                                                
12.  We don’t report the standard errors without White correction in order not to overburden the tables. They
can be obtained from the authors upon request. It should be noted that with the exception of the clustering
method for a correction of standard errors, the other corrections are unfriendly to institutional data. The
White correction for heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors as well as the Newey-West correction for
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors increase the standard errors and thus re-
duce significances. Clustering usually is unfriendly, but not necessarily so. For a comparison of the original
standard errors with the three methods of correction see Feld and Matsusaka (2003).– 15 –
10 percent significance level. This result does not change if both indicators of JI are intro-
duced in one equation (Column (4)). De facto JI has a significantly positive impact on eco-
nomic growth while the positive impact of de iure JI is not significant.
Table 2: OLS-Regressions of GDP Growth per Capita from 1980 to 1998 on Judicial Inde-
pendence and Controls, Baseline Specifications
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
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Dummy for Georgia – – – – 13.305**
(9.81)
Constant -0.750 -2.986 -2.544 -4.194 -1.968
2 R 0.123 0.153 0.263 0.266 0.595
SER 2.543 2.499 2.371 2.367 1.759
J. -B. 226.253** 151.088** 118.143** 81.629** 3.313
Observations 66 66 57 57 57
The numbers in parentheses are the absolute values of the estimated t-statistics, based on the White het-
eroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’ or ‘(*)’ show that the estimated parameter is significantly
different from zero on the 1, 5, or 10 percent level, respectively. SER is the standard error of the regression, and
J. -B. the value of the Jarque-Bera-test on normality of the residuals.
A basic problem in all equations presented in Table 2 is the fact that the hypothesis of a nor-
mal distribution of the residuals of each equation can be rejected on the 0.1 percent signifi-
cance level. These test statistics indicate that outliers may be hiding in the data set that might
drive the results. An analysis of the residuals reveals that Georgia is an outlier in that sense to
any statistical criteria. Since only a short term growth rate is used for Georgia, it appears rea-
sonable to introduce a dummy variable taking on the value of one for Georgia and zero oth-
erwise. Including this dummy variable, the estimation results in Column (5) of Table 2 indi-
cate that the hypothesis of normality of the residuals cannot be rejected any more according to
the Jarque Bera test statistics. Real GDP growth per capita can be explained to nearly 60 per-
cent. Aside the dummy variable for Georgia that is highly significant, the three basic eco-
nomic variables keep their impacts qualitatively and have the expected signs. Both, domestic– 16 –
investment and initial GDP are significantly positive at the 1 percent significance level. The
proxy for human capital does again not turn out to be statistically significant. Controlling for
Georgia, de facto JI is significantly increasing real GDP growth per capita. The impact of de
iure JI is neither significant nor is it robust to the outlier. The sign of the indicator of de iure
JI reverses, although it is far from reaching significance. From this basic analysis, it can thus
be concluded that de facto JI has a relatively robust and significant positive impact on GDP
growth while the growth impact of de iure JI is zero.
6.1 Analyzing Single Indicators
From the previous results, a natural question emerges: What is driving the different results
with respect to de iure and de facto JI? In order to find out the impact of different components
of both JI indicators, we include the single indicators separately. Because the answers to the
single questions underlying both indexes are not complete for each question, the missing val-
ues are set to the mean of each variable. This is a method that can be found quite often in sur-
vey studies. Although this might appear to be a questionable method, it does provide insights
as to whether there are specific components of JI that exert particular impacts on economic
growth. With respect to de iure JI, the respective results support those from the baseline
specifications. Since one part of the different variables is positively and the other part is
negatively correlated with GDP growth, it is no surprise that the index as an aggregate of
those counterveiling influences does not have any impact. Moreover, nearly none of the single
indicators exhibits a statistically significant impact on GDP growth. It does thus not appear to
be particularly interesting to present these results in detail.
It could however be argued that only a selection of the components of de iure JI is necessary
to establish JI.13 If parliament needs a supermajority to remove judges from the court, to
change the rules for removing judges and if judges’ salaries must be competitive, then judges
have already arrived at a crucial ‘minimum’ set of factors establishing independence. In addi-
tion, it may play a role if the stability of the powers and procedures of the court are specified
in the constitution itself. We therefore include only these three components of de iure JI,
whether the procedures are specified in the constitution, whether there is a supermajority re-
quirement and whether judges are adequately paid, in the model. The results are presented in
Column (1) of Table 3. According to the 
2 c -statistics at the bottom of Table 3, the hypothesis– 17 –
that the three indicators are not jointly significantly affecting GDP growth can be rejected on
the one percent level. Of these three variables, only the constitutional specification of the
court’s procedures has an individually significant effect on GDP growth and the expected
positive sign. The supermajority requirement has the expected positive sign, but is not signifi-
cant on any conventional level, while the adequate payment of judges has a negative sign
without reaching significance. The impact of the control variables is not affected by this
change in the specification. Nor are the diagnostic statistics.
This is different in the case of de facto JI as column (2) of Table 3 indicates. In contrast to de
iure JI, it is less obvious that one of the components making up for the index could be inter-
preted as a necessary condition for de facto JI. Thus, all eight components of de facto JI are
presented in Table 3. The 
2 c -statistics on joint significance of these eight components re-
veals that the hypothesis that these variables jointly have no impact on real GDP per capita
growth can be rejected on the 1 percent significance level. This result is again merely reflect-
ing the result for the composite index of de facto JI, but it clarifies as well that the single
components of  de facto JI exert a more homogeneous positive impact on GDP growth.
Moreover, it appears to be statistically most important that judges of the highest courts keep
their real income at least constant in real terms. The respective variable is by far the most im-
portant variable in statistical terms and is significant on the 1 percent level.
This result is critical because it might reflect a reverse causation effect: Judges’ salaries are
supposed to depend on income growth such that the impact runs from GDP growth to real
income improvements instead of the opposite direction. This may severely affect the inter-
pretation of the results as well if this is the most important variable for the index of de facto
JI. We hence exclude the real income improvements as an explanatory variable. The results
(in Column (3) of Table 4) are not tremendously affected by that change in the specification
although all remaining eight indicators now have a positive impact on GDP growth. None of
these influences is individually significant at any conventional level. The hypothesis that they
are not jointly influencing GDP growth can however be rejected on the 10 percent signifi-
cance level according to the
2 c -statistics at the bottom of Table 3. Still, some worries remain
as to the impact of the index of de facto JI in the baseline regressions.
                                                                                                                                     
13.  We owe this suggestion to an anonymous referee. The results for the full set of components of de iure JI can
be obtained from the authors upon request.– 18 –
Table 3: OLS-Regressions of GDP Growth per Capita from 1980 to 1998 on Single Compo-
nents of Judicial Independence and Controls, 66 (57) Countries







Adequate Payment of Judges -0.174
(0.20)
– – –
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(2.96)
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De iure Judicial Independence – – – -0.208
(0.11)
De facto Judicial Independence without
Real Income Improvements of Judges
– – – 4.953(*)
(1.98)
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Constant -1.829 -4.435 -4.063 -3.574
2 R 0.564 0.553 0.523 0.610
SER 1.792 1.815 1.875 1.725
J. -B. 4.566 2.128 1.975 1.283
2 c -statistic 16.816** 20.763** 13.068(*) –
For notes see Table 2. The 
2 c -statistic is a test on the hypothesis that all indicators of judicial independence in
one equation are jointly equal to zero. The estimation results for the Dummy for Georgia are not reported.
In the next step, we reconstruct the index by excluding real income improvements of judges
and estimate the baseline regressions again. Column (4) of Table 3 hence corresponds to Col-– 19 –
umn (5) of Table 2.
14 It is obvious from these results that the positive impact of de facto JI on
economic growth is qualitatively not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of the real income
improvements of judges. Quantitatively, the impact of de facto JI on GDP growth increases
however as does its statistical significance. The control variables are only slightly affected.
These results underline the above conjecture: Judicial independence in some countries may
solely be written down in legal documents without actually keeping up judicial independence
de facto. Judicial independence is important for economic growth, but it cannot be simply
obtained by changes in law. It must be backed up by actually living judicial independence.
Moreover, de facto JI is not simply dominated by real income improvements of judges such
that the results do not appear to be due to a reversed causation effect. Nevertheless, it proves
to be relatively important for de iure JI to have a positive impact on GDP growth if the high-
est court’s procedures are specified in the constitution. It could be argued that it is the neces-
sary condition for judicial independence anyway. In the remainder of the paper, we will how-
ever not elaborate the importance of the constitutional specification of procedures further, but
instead leave it to future research. We focus on the robustness of the de facto JI. De iure JI is
thus only used as a control variable in the concluding sections.
6.2 Robustness to Additional Variables
As usual, the impact of the de facto JI indicator may be reflecting third variables that are not
yet included in the estimation equation. Put differently, an omitted variable bias might influ-
ence the estimation results. In order to check the robustness of the results to the inclusion of
other variables, average government consumption in percent of GDP, openness, average
population growth, average inflation as additional economic controls and the legal origin of
the countries, several indicators of economic freedom that include some assessment of judi-
cial independence,
15 an indicator of the lack of political instability and the age of the constitu-
tion as additional political/institutional controls are included in the econometric model. As a
                                                
14.  Like in Table 2, the respective regression is performed with only 57 observations in contrast to the other
three regressions in Table 3 which are on the basis of 66 countries.
15.  It looks strange to include the economic freedom indicators in addition to the indices of de iure and de facto
judicial independence if the former already includes some aspects of judicial independence. However, it has
to be noted that the judicial independence indices capture this particular effect of components included in
the economic freedom indicator properly by using multivariate regression analysis. The measured effect of
the economic freedom indicators is thus only that of the other components excluding judicial independence.
An alternative method would be the explicit exclusion of that specific component from the economic free-
dom indicators. Both methods are equivalent.– 20 –
workhorse equation to proceed, column (4) of Table 3 is used. This equation has proved to be
robust to outliers and it contains the revised de facto JI index without real income improve-
ments of judges. The results of that exercise are presented in Table 4.
Table 4: Regressions of GDP Growth per Capita from 1980 to 1998 on Judicial Independ-
ence and Controls, Robustness Tests
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)








De facto Judicial Independence









De facto Judicial Independence
without Real Income Improve-
ments of Judges, but more than 3
components of it filled out.
– – – 5.932*
(2.19)
Additional Variables
English Legal Origin – -0.244
(0.35)
– –
Socialist Legal Origin – -1.114
(1.27)
– –
French Legal Origin – -1.046(*)
(1.71)
– –
German Legal Origin – -0.295
(0.41)
– –
2 c -statistic: Legal Origin – 9.001 – –
Lack of Political Instability – – 0.272
(0.46)
–
Age of the Constitution – – 0.015**
(3.35)
–
Government Consumption (in %
of GDP), Openness (in % of
GDP), Average Population
Growth, 1980-1998, Inflation
yes no no no
2 c -statistic: Economic Vari-
ables
5.000 – – –
Economic Freedom Indicators no no yes no
2 c -statistic: Economic Freedom
Indicators
– – 29.131** –
2 R 0.619 0.601 0.590 0.624
SER 1.710 1.745 1.033 1.747
J. -B. 8.263 0.275 1.002 2.716
Observations 57 57 35 51
For notes see Table 2. Results for the standard controls, the single economic variables, the single indicators of
economic freedom, the dummy for Georgia and constant are not reported.– 21 –
Only the results for the two indexes of JI are exhibited in all equations. With the exception of
legal origin, lack of political instability and the age of the constitution, the results for control
variables are not presented. Only the 
2 c -statistics on joint significance of the additional eco-
nomic controls and the economic freedom indicators are reported in order to assess the valid-
ity of the estimation results. It should be noted as well that the number of observations is re-
duced to 35 countries if the age of the constitution and the economic freedom indicators are
used such that the degrees of freedom in that regression are reduced to the lowest justifiable
number.
None of the additional economic variables has a single significant impact on GDP growth. In
addition, the hypothesis that they are not jointly significant cannot be rejected on any conven-
tional significance level. As the results in column (1) of Table 4 indicate, the impact of de
facto JI remains robust to the inclusion of additional economic variables. The same holds with
respect to the legal origin variables. Judicial independence may be the result of the legal and
political environment in general. For example, judicial independence may depend upon the
legal tradition of a country such that judicial independence is less pronounced, say, in coun-
tries with a Socialist or French legal origin. The effect of judicial independence measured in
the regressions above may then only reflect the impact of legal origin. In order to capture that
impact, the respective variables reported by La Porta et al. (1999) are included in the regres-
sions. These are five dummy variables taking on the value of one in the case of English,
French, Socialist, German or Scandinavian legal origin, respectively. Because these dummies
together are perfectly collinear, Scandinavian legal origin is used as the reference group. The
consideration of these additional institutional variables does not change the results neither of
the JI indicators nor of the economic controls. The legal origin dummies jointly are not sig-
nificantly different from zero according to the 
2 c -statistics reported in Table 4.
Like judicial independence might be the result of the legal origin, it may also be shaped by
political stability. It is easy to grant judges de facto judicial independence in quiet times, but
much more difficult in cases of political turmoil. Since political turmoil is usually leading to
economic crises (and vice versa), the positive impact of JI on economic growth would simply
reflect the impact of political stability, and an omitted variable bias would result. Political
stability is controlled for by a variable on the lack of political instability provided by the
World Bank (2001). According to the results in Column (3) of Table 4, the lack of political
instability is not significantly different from zero although it has the expected positive sign.
However, the indicators of economic freedom are jointly significant on the 1 percent level as– 22 –
the 
2 c -statistics indicate. In addition, the age of the constitution has a highly significant
positive impact of GDP growth. The index of de facto JI is measuring the long term experi-
ence of a country with respect to judicial independence. It should thus be expected that coun-
tries with an older constitution have also established JI for a longer time period and thus ar-
rive at higher index values. Introducing all these variables together, the impact of de facto JI
on economic growth remains positive and significant on the 10 percent level. Despite the
theoretical arguments for an impact of the additional institutional variables on JI, de facto JI
has a robust and significant positive influence on economic growth.
16
Given these rather robust results, the reliability of the constructed JI indicators may raise the
only remaining doubts on the validity of the estimation results. A final test of robustness is
thus concerned with a check as to how robust the impact of judicial independence, in particu-
lar the de facto JI indicator, is to changes in the definition of that variable. As noted above,
countries were only included in the sample of the de facto indicator if they replied to at least
three of the eight components comprising de facto JI. This decision is of course arbitrary. We
could as well have demanded each other number between 1 and 8. We therefore change our
reservation number of replies to that question as a robustness test. A glance at Appendix 3
reveals that the countries providing replies to only 3 components are already the strangest
countries in the ranking. For example, the two highest ranking countries Armenia and Kuwait
do not have a strong record for judicial independence, while the Netherlands and the Czech
Republic may be ranked too low according to usual prejudice.
Column (4) of Table 4 therefore reports the specification of the baseline model, like in column
(4) of Table 3, that is robust to outliers. It contains as well the corrected index of de facto JI
without real income improvements of judges, but the index is based on at least 4 components
of that index. The number of observations is then reduced to only 51. It is again not necessary
to describe these results in more detail. Of course, the point estimates of the single variables
change. This is however no surprise given the changes in sample size and in the indicator for
de facto JI. The latter impact turns out to be even stronger in statistical and economic terms:
Significance levels are slightly higher and the size of the coefficient is higher as well. The
inclusion of countries incompletely answering to the survey in the de facto indicator obvi-
                                                
16.  In addition to the political and legal variables reported, robustness tests were performed using indicators of
ethnic/linguistic fractionalization of a country and of the number of coups. The de facto indicator of judicial
independence remained robust to any of these additional specifications not reported here.– 23 –
ously weakens the results. All in all, this is strong evidence for a positive impact of judicial
independence on economic growth.
7  Conclusions and Open Questions
Using two new indicators of judicial independence, a de iure and a de facto indicator that are
obtained from a survey among experts in 71 countries, we have analyzed the impact of judi-
cial independence on economic growth. While de iure judicial independence does not have a
clear impact on economic growth, de facto JI positively influences real GDP growth per cap-
ita in a sample of 57 countries. This distinction between de iure and de facto JI indicates that
it does not suffice to write JI in legal documents. It is necessary to shape JI by additional in-
formal procedures that may be accompanied and enforced by informal social sanctions. Issues
like the average term length of judges, its deviation from the term lengths to be expected
based on legal documents, effective removals of judges before the end of their terms as well
as a secure income for the judges appear to be more important for economic growth than de
iure independence. Only the constitutional specification of the court’s procedures as one as-
pect of de iure JI proves to be significant and positive. The impact of de facto JI on economic
growth is robust to outliers, to the inclusion of several additional economic, legal and political
control variables and to the construction of the index. It can thus be concluded that judicial
independence matters for economic growth. That de facto JI appears to have a stronger impact
on GDP growth than de iure JI finds its analogue in the central bank literature according to
which de facto CBI is a better predictor of inflation than de iure CBI (see Section 3).
Several potential extensions of the approach in this paper have been mentioned in the passing.
The first is a closer inspection of the components of de iure JI and their robustness on the in-
clusion of other economic and institutional factors. It is quite interesting to note that the con-
stitutional specification of procedures, but none of the other components of de iure JI affect
economic growth. The scope of this paper is too limited to study this effect and potential in-
teraction effects with other components in more detail. It must be left to future research. An-
other natural extension is focusing on the weights attached to the different components in the
construction of both indexes. This might range from arguably core features of JI being at-
tached a higher weight to indexes constructed from factor analysis. It should be noted how-
ever that both, attaching higher weights to a selection of components of JI that one thinks are
more important as well as indexes based on factor analysis can be supposed to increase the
explanatory power of JI in statistical terms. Compared to that alternative procedure, our ap-
proach is relatively conservative and less vulnerable to criticism.– 24 –
Another extension, suggested to us by a referee, is a variation of the question and thus the
dependent variable analyzed. One of the transmission channels by which JI may influence
GDP growth is private investment either in physical or human capital. Both variables are in-
cluded as explanatory controls to explain GDP growth in this model. Again, the analysis of
that question is beyond the scope of this paper in particular because it directly leads to a
whole bunch of further interesting questions. Similarly, the discussion about legal origin in
the finance literature appears to warrant additional investigation after the impact of legal ori-
gin on economic growth is strongly dominated by de facto JI.
In future studies, it might also be interesting to test for the independence not of constitutional
courts, but of commercial courts. It could be the case that private investors are primarily in-
terested in how commercial and not constitutional disputes are resolved. Further, one might
want to fine-tune some of the variables of the de facto indicator: right now, any deviation
between expected and effective term-length will lead to a reduction of a country’s score. It,
however, makes sense to distinguish between politically motivated and other changes. A di-
vergence might simply be due to a judge dying before the end of his term. This distinction
could also be made with regard to some other variables.
It was mentioned above that there are some similarities between JI and central bank inde-
pendence (CBI) that deserve further research. In the CBI-literature, the degree of independ-
ence has been taken as an exogenous variable. The explanation of the different degrees of the
de facto-independence remains a clear deficit of the theory (Berger, 1997). But it almost sug-
gests itself to hypothesize that an independent judiciary is a precondition for an independent
central bank – and thus to endogenize CBI (see also Voigt, 2002). This hypothesis could, of
course, be extended to other independent government agencies such as antitrust agencies, sta-
tistical offices etc. It could, of course, also be the case that there is a high correlation between
the two but that the (de facto) CBI is not caused by the (de facto) JI because a third variable,
like culture, helps to explain both (see, e.g., Hayo, 1998).
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Appendix 1: Text of the questionnaire combined with coding used
Making Promises Credible –
Independent Courts as a Proxy for the Rule of Law
QUESTIONNAIRE
Please return to:






This research project is an attempt to make judicial independence measurable and thus com-
parable between countries. I would be grateful if you could help me with your knowledge
concerning the country on which you are an expert. I would appreciate if you could (a) answer
the following questions, and (b) could indicate good sources to get the desired information
(primary as well as secondary).
If you are interested, I would be pleased to keep you informed on the progress concerning the
indicator. In that case, please provide me with your address. Of course, the easiest way to re-
turn the questionnaire is by e-mail.
Thank you very much for your help. Yours sincerely
Stefan Voigt– 26 –
Country for which information is provided:
_____________________________________
A de iure measure for court independence
(1)  Is the highest court mentioned in the constitution? (1/2)17 YES   (  )
NO
a.  Are its competencies enumerated in the constitution?  (1/8) YES   (  ) NO
b.  Are its procedures specified in the constitution?  (1/8) YES   (  ) NO
c.  Is access to the highest court specified in the constitution?  (1/8) YES   (  ) NO
d.  Are the arrangements concerning the members of the highest court enumerated in the
constitution?
aa. Is the term length specified in the constitution? (1/16) YES   (  ) NO
bb. Is the number of judges specified in the constitution? (1/16) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(2)  How difficult is it to amend the constitution?
a.  Is a majority necessary that is above that necessary
for changing ordinary legislation? (1) YES   (  ) NO
b.  How many branches of government have to agree? (1/4) 1; (1/2) 2;
(3/4) 3
c.  Are majority decisions necessary at different points in time? (1/4) YES   (  ) NO
* Note on coding concerning this question: The sum of b and c provided that a is answered in
the affirmative
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
                                                
17  The numbers in parantheses are the codings used; these were not part of the questionnaire as sent to the
country experts.– 27 –
(3)  How are the members of the highest court elected/nominated? (PLEASE TICK THE
APPROPRIATE LETTER)
a.  Judges are nominated and elected by one or more members of the executive
b.  Judges are nominated by one or more members of the executive and are elected by par-
liament (or a committee thereof).
c.  Judges are nominated by one or more members of the executive and are elected by the
judiciary.
d.  Judges are nominated and elected by parliament (or a committee thereof).
e.  Judges are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) and are elected by one or
more members of the executive.
f.  Judges are nominated by parliament (or a committee thereof) and are elected by the ju-
diciary.
g.  Judges are nominated and elected by the judiciary.
h.  Judges are nominated by the judiciary and are elected by one or more members of the
executive.
i.  Judges are nominated by the judiciary and are elected by parliament (or a committee
thereof).
j.  Judges are nominated by the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive and are elected
by actors not representing any government branch (academics, the public at large
Competence to elect/appoint members
of highest court
Executive Legislature Judiciary
Executive 0 1/3 2/3




highest court Judiciary 2/3 2/3 1– 28 –
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(4)  What is the legal term length of the judges on the highest court?
NUMBER OF YEARS____________
In comparison, parliament’s election period in number of years_____________
Concerning legal term length, emphasis in the institutional arrangement is usually
either on a specification in number of years or on a fixed retirement age. We thus
need two coding scales. Here they are:
Term of office(too)          coding
‡ 12 years 1,0
10 £ too < 12 0,8
8 £ too < 10 0,6
6 £ too < 8 0,4
4 £ too < 6 0,2
4 > too 0,0
Often, judges are appointed rather later in their careers. Early and mandatory re-
tirement is hypothesized to constrain ji because judges could be less daring during
their first couple of years in office. We used the following coding:
Too                                                           coding
for life 1,0
Mandatory retirement (mr) ‡ 75 years 1,0
65 £ mr < 75 0,8
65 > mr 0,6.
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(5)  Can judges be reelected? (0) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(6)  How can judges be removed from office? (PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE LET-
TER)– 29 –
a.  only by judicial procedure; 1
b.  by decision of one or more members of the executive; 0
c.  by decision of parliament (or a committee thereof); 0
d.  by joint decision of one or more members of the executive and of parliament (or a
committee thereof). ½.
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(7)  Is there a measure against income reduction of judges? Is there a mechanism securing
adjustment in real terms? (1) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(8)  Are the judges paid adequately?
a.  Are they paid more than university professors? (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
b.  Are they paid more than an average private lawyer? (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
c. Are they paid as well as the minister of justice? (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(9)  Who has the possibility to access the highest court?
a.  Individuals in any case relevant to the constitution and with which they are personally
concerned. 1
b.  Individuals, but only in a subset of cases relevant to the constitution (such as human
rights) ½.
c.  Only other government branches. 0
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(10)  Is there a general rule allocating the responsibility concerning incoming cases to specific
judges? (1) YES   (  ) NO
(or does the chief justice have discretion on the allocation of cases?) (  ) YES   (  ) NO– 30 –
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(11)  Does the constitution (or the law establishing the highest court) preview the power of
constitutional review? (1) YES   (  ) NO
Are there any limits to it (e.g., only before a law has been promulgated?)
(  ) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(12) Does the highest court have to publish
(a) the main reasons for a decision   (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
(b) an extended proof?   (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
(12)  Are dissenting opinions published regularly?   (1/3) YES   (  ) NO
A de facto measure for court independence
(13)  What has been the effective average term length of judges since the respective legal
foundations have been passed? IN NUMBER OF YEARS______________________
For coding, the number of years was multiplied by 0.05.
a.  does it deviate from the average term length
to be expected by the legal foundations?    (0) YES   (  ) NO
b.  How many judges have been removed from office before end of term? NUMBER_____
For coding, any positive number led to a zero-coding.
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(14)  How many times has the number of judges been changed since 1960? NUMBER______
The answers were coded using the following table:
Number of changes         Coding
0  1,0





A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(15)  Has the income of judges remained at least
constant in real terms since 1960?    (1) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(16)  Has the budget of the highest court remained
at least constant in real terms since 1960?     (1) YES   (  ) NO
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(17)  How often have the relevant articles of the Constitution (or the law on which the highest
court is based) been changed since 1960?
NUMBER OF CHANGES___________________________________________
The answers were coded according to the key used for variable 14.
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
(18)  In how many cases has one of the other government branches remained inactive when
its action was necessary for a decision to become effective?
NUMBER OF CASES______________________________________________
The answers were again coded according to the key used for variable 14.
A GOOD SOURCE FOR MORE DETAILED INFORMATION IS__________________
_____________________________________________________________________
General comments (please feel free to make any comment):– 32 –
Appendix 2: The de iure Index








1 Colombia 0,939 12
2 Phillipines 0,909 10
3 Brazil 0,907 12
4 Georgia 0,893 12
5 Slovenia 0,869 12
6 Singapore 0,851 12
7 Russia 0,845 11
8 Botswana 0,841 12
9 Ecuador 0,835 12
10 Greece 0,833 10
11 Belgium 0,825 10
12 Australia 0,817 11
13 Cyprus 0,817 12
14 Mexico 0,804 12
15 Nepal 0,799 12
16 Mauritius 0,797 11
17 Italy 0,793 12
18 Paraguay 0,781 8
19 Denmark 0,779 11
20 Chile 0,778 9
21 Pakistan 0,765 12
22 Czech Republic 0,761 12
23 South Africa 0,761 11
24 Austria 0,733 11
25 Germany 0,729 12
25 Fiji Islands 0,729 11
27 Kenya 0,709 12
28 Egypt 0,708 12
29 Poland 0,693 11
30 USA 0,685 12
31 Costa Rica 0,685 12
32 Namibia 0,684 12
33 Canada 0,681 10
34 Turkey 0,678 12
35 Argentina 0,665 12







37 Hungary 0,651 11
38 Venezuela 0,650 12
39 Bahamas 0,646 12
40 Estonia 0,641 11
41 France 0,634 11
42 Netherlands 0,631 12
43 Armenia 0,629 12
44 India 0,629 12
45 Japan 0,622 12
46 Jordan 0,615 8
47 Korea, South 0,607 12
48 Sweden 0,605 10
49 Trinidad/ Tobago 0,596 10
50 Taiwan 0,575 12
51 Kuwait 0,574 10
52 Croatia 0,570 11
53 Slovakia 0,569 12
54 Spain 0,551 12
55 Romania 0,548 7
56 Kazakhstan 0,538 11
57 Portugal 0,530 10
58 Ivory Coast 0,507 11
59 Guatemala 0,499 11
60 Montenegro 0,465 11
61 Ghana 0,464 7
62 Switzerland 0,459 12
63 Azerbaijan 0,451 10
64 Lithuania 0,447 11
65 Mozambique 0,441 12
66 China 0,406 12
67 Bulgaria 0,397 12
68 Vanuatu 0,377 10
69 Malaysia 0,313 8
70 Morocco 0,275 5
71 Tanzania 0,265 12
N=71; mean=0,654; standard deviation=0,157.Appendix 3: The de facto Index







1 Armenia 1,000 3
1 Kuwait 1,000 3
3 Switzerland 0,943 7
4 Turkey 0,933 6
5 Costa Rica 0,920 5
6 Austria 0,900 4
6 Japan 0,900 4
9 South Africa 0,867 6
10 Taiwan 0,863 8
11 Israel 0,860 5
12 Italy 0,858 6
13 Georgia 0,850 6
14 Australia 0,819 8
15 Denmark 0,813 6
16 Belgium 0,800 8
16 Germany 0,800 6
16 Hungary 0,800 8
19 France 0,780 5
20 Spain 0,750 8
21 Cyprus 0,743 7
22 Phillipines 0,731 8
23 India 0,708 6
24 Mexico 0,707 7
25 Portugal 0,706 8
26 Estonia 0,700 8
26 Sweden 0,700 5
28 Croatia 0,657 7
29 Paraguay 0,600 3
30 Korea, South 0,588 8
31 Chile 0,575 4







33 Jordan 0,560 5
34 Guatemala 0,550 7
35 USA 0,546 6
36 Pakistan 0,525 8
37 Mozambique 0,520 5
37 Nepal 0,520 5
39 Greece 0,500 4
40 Brazil 0,494 8
41 Netherlands 0,467 3
42 Bahamas 0,450 4
43 Fiji Islands 0,436 7
44 Lithuania 0,433 6
45 Slovenia 0,431 8
46 Singapore 0,421 7
47 Botswana 0,414 7
48 Ecuador 0,400 8
48 Venezuela 0,400 4
50 Trinidad/ Tobago 0,388 4
51 China 0,370 5
52 Argentina 0,333 6
53 Vanuatu 0,320 5
54 Slovakia 0,319 8
55 Ghana 0,300 3
56 Malaysia 0,270 5
57 Egypt 0,240 5
58 Kenya 0,175 6
59 Czech Republic 0,167 3
60 Bulgaria 0,133 6
60 Russia 0,133 6
62 Montenegro 0,100 4
N=62; mean=0,591; standard deviation=0,242.34
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